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Chapter 1
The Cognitive Science of Religion, 
Philosophy and Theology: A Survey 
of the Issues
Hans van Eyghen, Rik Peels, and Gijsbert van den Brink
Abstract Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is still a rather young discipline. 
Depending on what one deems to be the first paper or book in the field, the disci-
pline is now almost forty or almost thirty years old. Philosophical and theological 
discussion on CSR started in the late 2000s. From its onset, the main focus has been 
the (potential) epistemic consequences of CSR, and this focus is dominant even 
today. Some of those involved in the debate discussed the relevance of CSR for 
further issues in philosophy of religion, and other have examined how CSR weighs 
in on various theological questions. Finally, a small number of philosophers offered 
criticisms or support for various CSR-theories. In this chapter, we give an overview 
of the debates so far and provide an outline of the book.
1.1  Introduction
This volume provides contributions that display the most recent developments both 
in CSR and in the philosophical reflection on its epistemic and theological conse-
quences. Some of the essays offer an historical overview of the debate until now, 
others explore CSR’s epistemic ramifications, and yet others scrutinize its possible 
theological consequences. This introduction is structured as follows. First, we 
sketch the state-of-the-art in various debates elicited by CSR: the debate about reli-
gious epistemology (section “CSR and religious epistemology”), the philosophy of 
religion more broadly (section “CSR and philosophy of religion”), theology (sec-
tion “CSR and theology”), and various other philosophical issues regarding CSR 
(section “Philosophers on CSR”). After that, we explain what is at stake in these 
discussions (Sect. 1.3). Finally, we give an overview of what is ahead (Sect. 1.4).
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1.2  State of the Art
 CSR and Religious Epistemology
The main body of philosophical literature on CSR addresses the question whether 
CSR-theories imply a negative verdict on the epistemic standing of religious belief. 
Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett initiated this discussion. Dawkins referred to 
CSR-theories in order to argue that religious beliefs result from an in-built irratio-
nality mechanism (Dawkins 2007: 184–86). Dennett made similar claims and 
argued that religious beliefs are brought about by a “fantasy-generation process” 
(Dennett 2006: 121). Dawkins’ and Dennett’s rather unelaborated claims triggered 
a number of papers that defended the epistemic viability of religious belief. For 
example, Justin Barrett responded by reconstructing possible arguments against 
theistic belief arising from (among other approaches) CSR-theories and argued that 
they are unconvincing. One point he made is that many arguments have too much 
collateral damage if successful, because they do not just discredit religious beliefs 
but many other ideas that our minds encourage us to believe as well (Barrett 2007). 
Michael Murray also took up the task of defending the epistemic justification of 
religious belief over against CSR-based arguments (Murray 2008, 2009). Like 
Barrett, Murray reconstructs possible arguments against religious belief and 
attempts to refute them. Murray mainly discusses arguments for the conclusion that 
religious belief is unreliably formed. He concludes that the arguments either have 
too much collateral damage or cannot show what they aim to show, viz. that reli-
gious belief forming mechanisms are unreliable.
Alvin Plantinga mentions some CSR-theories as a potential source of conflict 
between science and religion, but argues that the conflict is only superficial because 
CSR relies on methodological naturalism (Plantinga 2011: chapter 5). In two other 
papers more specific defenses of the positive epistemic status of religious belief 
over against CSR-based considerations are made. Kelly James Clark and Danny 
Rabinowitz reconstruct arguments that rely on CSR-theories for the conclusion that 
religious belief is “unsafe” and argue that they fail (Clark and Rabinowitz 2011). 
Joshua Thurow follows a similar strategy. He rebuts self-constructed arguments 
based on CSR for the conclusion that religious belief is irrational (Thurow 2013).
In 2008, Leo Näreaho wrote a paper that started a discussion on CSR’s (alleged) 
commitment to naturalism. Näreaho argued that CSR shows a strong commitment 
to “the naturalistic, cognitive-scientific research program” (Näreaho 2008: 84). 
According to Näreaho this commitment leads CSR to find causal explanations for 
religious phenomena by basing its claims particularly on the investigations of 
 cognitive science and cognitive psychology (Näreaho 2008). David Leech and Aku 
Visala responded that CSR is not necessarily committed to naturalism. As a result, 
on their view, CSR is compatible with theism (Leech and Visala 2011a, b). On a 
separate occasion, Visala argued at length that CSR need not be wedded to a strictly 
naturalistic framework and developed an alternative framework that he calls ‘broad 
naturalism’ (Visala 2011). Näreaho responded that not all versions of theism are 
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compatible with what CSR shows. He argues that CSR-theories are not world-view 
neutral, but rule out forms of theism which hold that God actively intervenes in the 
world. They do not rule out forms of theism where God is the structuring cause of 
the universe (Näreaho 2014). In a rejoinder, Leech and Visala deny that CSR- 
theories are necessarily committed to a “naturalistic, cognitive-scientific research 
program” which claims that cognition should have its origin strictly in natural pro-
cesses. They argue that this commitment is merely assumed by CSR-theorists and 
not implied by empirical evidence (Leech and Visala 2014). In line with Leech and 
Visala’s response, Daniel Lim has suggested that naturalistic explanations of reli-
gious belief are of a different kind  than personal explanations. Therefore, CSR's 
commitment to naturalism does not exclude personal explanations with God as the 
proximate cause of religious belief (Lim 2016).
Two authors moved the focus of the debate and argued that CSR-theories support 
the epistemic status of religious belief rather than damaging it. Kelly Clark and 
Justin Barrett argued that what CSR-theories show fits well with a position known 
as ‘Reformed Epistemology’ (Clark and Barrett 2010, 2011).1 They argue that both 
CSR-theories and Reformed Epistemology agree that belief in God is formed non- 
inferentially and immediately by a cognitive faculty. Like Reformed Epistemologists, 
they add that immediately and non-reflectively formed beliefs merit an innocent- 
until- proven-guilty status and are thus prima facie justified. Justin Barrett made a 
similar argument in collaboration with Ian Church (Barrett and Church 2013).
Interestingly, leaving aside non-argumentative suggestions such as those of 
Dawkins and Dennett, elaborate arguments against the positive epistemic status of 
religious belief are of a later date than defenses. The best-known argument in this 
connection was developed by John Wilkins and Paul Griffiths. They argued that the 
truth of religious beliefs was not important for their evolutionary use. Drawing from 
CSR-theories, they showed that religious beliefs could have evolved even if they 
were not true. Since the evolutionary process selects for fitness and not primarily for 
truth, religious beliefs are not justified (Wilkins and Griffiths 2013). In the same 
year, Robert Nola offered two arguments. First, in his view CSR-theories show that 
the belief-forming process for religious beliefs is error-prone. Therefore, religious 
beliefs lack justification. Second, CSR-theories produce explanations for religious 
beliefs that outcompete folk-explanations of the origins of religious beliefs. As a 
result, the folk-ontology of God(s) is eliminated (Nola 2013). Using a slightly dif-
ferent strategy, Liz Goodnick argued that CSR-theories show that the faculties 
responsible for religious beliefs were selected for by natural selection. Since natural 
selection is not primarily aimed at truth, these faculties cannot be trusted (Goodnick 
2016). The most elaborate argument against the positive epistemic status of reli-
gious belief was advanced by Matthew Braddock (Braddock 2016). He claims that 
the mechanisms responsible for religious beliefs are unreliable because  CSR- theories 
1 Reformed Epistemology is an influential line of thought in current religious epistemology. It was 
first advanced in a collection of papers edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(Plantinga and Wolterstorff 1983). Its central claim is that religious belief can be rational without 
even if it is not based on arguments.
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show that they produce many false, polytheistic and finite god-beliefs. He concludes 
that we are not epistemically justified to hold any  god-beliefs.  One of the pres-
ent authors, Hans Van Eyghen, has  recently criticized these four arguments (Van 
Eyghen forthcoming).
 Two publications appealed to internal reasons within CSR-theories for holding 
that they pose no threat to the positive epistemic status of belief in God. Jonathan 
Jong, Christopher Kavanagh, and Aku Visala argue that CSR-theories do not have 
theism as their explanandum. They argue that CSR-theories only explain anthropo-
morphic, idolatrous beliefs. Explanations thereof have no bearing on the epistemic 
status of theism (Jong, Kavanagh, and Visala 2015). Additionally, James Jones 
argues that CSR-theories do not offer a full explanation of religious belief. This 
leaves room for sound religious reasons for belief (Jones 2016).
 CSR and Philosophy of Religion
A smaller group of authors discussed other ways in which CSR-theories might have 
implications for the philosophy of religion. One point of interest here is the relation 
between CSR and Reformed Epistemology. We already noted that Kelly Clark and 
Justin Barrett argued for convergence as part of a broader argument in defense of 
religious belief (Clark and Barrett 2010, 2011). Richard Sagar discussed the impact 
of CSR on Reformed Epistemology at length and also concludes that they square 
well (Sagar 2011). Helen de Cruz and Johan de Smedt are more critical here, argu-
ing that while there is some convergence, CSR does not fit well with a central idea 
in Reformed Epistemology, namely the idea that sin has epistemic consequences 
(De Cruz and De Smedt 2012).
Paul Draper and Ryan Nichols refer to CSR-theories in order to show that phi-
losophy of religion in general is in rather poor health. They argue that cognitive 
biases laid bare by CSR-research explain why philosophers of religion are often 
too partisan (in favor of religious belief) and use poor standards of evaluation 
(Draper and Nichols 2013). Max Baker Hytch discusses how CSR can weigh in on 
the problem of epistemic luck2 in the formation of religious beliefs (Baker-Hytch 
2014). Ruth Walker uses CSR-theories to argue for religious non-cognitivism 
(Walker 2006).3
Finally, broaching another classical field in the philosophy of religion, Helen de 
Cruz and Johan de Smedt discussed the relevance of CSR for the classical debate 
2 The term ‘epistemic luck’ refers to accidental or coincidental factors that lead a subject to hold 
true beliefs. The term became wide-spread in virtue of Duncan Pritchard’s use of the phrase 
(Pritchard 2005). Most epistemologists agree that true beliefs that are the result of epistemic luck 
do not amount to knowledge.
3 Defenders of religious non-cognitivism claim that religious claims do not have truth-value. 
Instead they are concerned with the sphere of human conduct and experience. Among the 
more influential defenders of religious non-cognitivism are D.Z. Philips and Don Cupitt.
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on theistic arguments (for a survey of this debate, see e.g. Peterson et al. 2013, 
Ch. 5). They survey five natural theological arguments for the existence of God 
and discuss how various cognitive mechanisms could make the arguments sound 
plausible. They conclude that CSR does not render the arguments unconvincing 
but that it does leave room for rational disagreement on their force (De Cruz and 
De Smedt 2015).
 CSR and Theology
Another area where CSR is obviously of interest is systematic theology. According 
to John Teehan, CSR-theories force a radical change in how theology should speak 
about God. The main reason is that CSR shows that religious belief was in an impor-
tant way shaped by natural selection and natural selection involves a great deal of 
evil (Teehan 2010). F. Leron Schults also proposed a radical reconceptualization of 
theology based on CSR, but a different one. According to him, CSR suggests an 
a-theology in line with the ‘theology of the death of God’ of the 1960s (Shults 
2014).4 One of the present  authors,  Gijsbert van den Brink, takes a less radical 
approach. He investigates the relation of CSR to revelation and argues that CSR 
need not undercut traditional Jewish-Christian claims that religion ultimately 
anchors in divine revelation (Van den Brink forthcoming: chapter 8). Adam Green 
argued that CSR shows that natural knowledge of God is shaped by social influ-
ences (Green 2013). Taede Smedes has pointed out that findings from CSR square 
well with Emil Brunner’s theological view on the imago Dei (Smedes 2014).
A small body of literature developed in response to Why Religion is Natural and 
Science is Not by Robert McCauley (McCauley 2011). In this book, McCauley 
argued that theological beliefs (like belief in an omniscient God) are far removed 
from beliefs people commonly have. He theorized that various cognitive mecha-
nisms quite naturally produce anthropomorphic and other theologically incorrect 
beliefs whereas holding theologically correct beliefs requires a great deal of cogni-
tive effort. Olli-Pekka Vainio accepts McCauley’s thesis and regards it as a vindica-
tion of theological beliefs (Vainio 2016). In response to McCauley, Helen de Cruz 
argued that theological concepts are not far removed from ordinary religious con-
cepts produced by cognitive mechanisms (De Cruz 2014). Justin Barrett took an 
intermediate position, arguing that some theologically correct Christian beliefs fit 
well with ordinary beliefs while others diverge (Barrett 2012).
4 The Death-of-God Theology was a movement in Christian theology in the 1950s and 1960s. It 
claimed that either God had ceased to exist or God’s existence could no longer be experienced. 
Its adherents tried to formulate radically non-transcendent ways of reading the gospel in what 
came to be called ‘Christian atheism’; for a brief critical introduction, see e.g. (Miller and Grenz 
1998: 79–86).
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 Philosophers on CSR
Being a discipline in which the definition of concepts plays an important role and 
having a diverse explanandum, CSR raised philosophical interest in its internal prac-
tice. Steven Horst discussed the use of the terms ‘intuitive’ and ‘counterintuitive’ in 
various CSR-theories (Horst 2013). David Nikkel laments the focus of CSR- theories 
on dualistic, disembodied religious concepts. He argues that many religious concepts 
do not fit this picture and he calls for a new way of doing research in CSR (Nikkel 
2015). James van Slyke also made a plea for a broader framework in CSR. He high-
lights the importance of emergence as an alternative to the reductive framework CSR 
(allegedly) knows (Van Slyke 2011). Lluis Oviedo called for a broader framework 
for CSR as well (Oviedo 2008). Based on findings in CSR- research, Neil van 
Leeuwen made a plea for conceptualizing religious beliefs as ‘credences’ rather than 
beliefs (Van Leeuwen 2017). Credences differ from beliefs because they are not (or 
less) responsive to evidence and are more dependent on practical settings.
Some philosophers criticized or supported theories in CSR. This usually happens 
in collaboration with scientists. Michael Murray criticized two CSR-theories. In 
collaboration with Lyn Moore he criticized the costly signaling theory. This theory 
states that religious rituals evolved as a way of signaling honesty to members of 
one’s group. Moore and Murray argue that signaling honesty through rituals is not 
an evolutionary stable trait. They add that the theory suffers from too many internal 
problems to give a good account of why religious rituals evolved (Murray and 
Moore 2009). In collaboration with Jeffrey Schloss, Murray also criticized the 
supernatural punishment theory. That theory states that religious beliefs evolved 
because the idea that there is a god who monitors and cares about human behavior 
and will punish or reward people according to their behavior fostered cooperation. 
Schloss and Murray argue that the theory is not in as bad a shape as the costly sig-
naling theory but still needs improvement (Schloss and Murray 2011). Kelly Clark 
does not criticize but offers support for the supernatural punishment theory. In col-
laboration with Justin Winslett, he surveys evidence for the occurrence of belief in 
punishing gods in ancient China. Both argue that the prevalence of this belief adds 
support for the supernatural punishment theory (Clark and Winslett 2011).
1.3  What Is at Stake?
What is at stake in the debate on the philosophical (epistemic, etc.) ramifications of 
CSR can perhaps best be elucidated by pointing out how the debate on the signifi-
cance of CSR would continue without sufficient philosophical reflection. What we 
often see in such cases is that argumentative shortcuts are made and people jump to 
conclusions that cannot stand the test of careful scrutiny. For example, scholars with 
an atheist background can be quick to derive atheist conclusions from CSR, thus 
supposedly undergirding their personal view of life in a scientific way. In particular, 
it is often suggested that since we now know about the natural ways in which 
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religious beliefs came into existence, it is clear that such beliefs are illusory. Indeed, 
at the moment this kind of rhetoric (sometimes taking its cue from the comments of 
Dawkins and Dennett with which we started our survey) is nowadays quite common 
in academic circles. From sentences such as “Religious belief is produced by “nor-
mal” cognitive structures. Religious thought is an unintended byproduct of cogni-
tive modules (mechanisms or networks) that emerged through natural selection 
owing to their ability to solve important adaptive tasks” it is tacitly concluded that 
this is all there is to say about the causes of belief in God.5
Religious believers, on the other hand, are sometimes quick to point out that this 
is a non sequitur and to leave it at that. They are right that such rhetorical framings 
of the issue hide a sloppy way of thinking. For even if CSR does enable us to estab-
lish beyond any reasonable doubt the evolutionary and cognitive pathways along 
which religious beliefs arose (which is not, or at least not yet, the case), it does not 
and by definition cannot exclude the possibility that God arranged for these path-
ways in the first place in order to get people to know him in the long run. Like in so 
many other cases, science just elucidates ‘how God did the job’ – which is interest-
ing, but hardly a fatal blow to religion. Thus, it is only when naturalism is tacitly 
presupposed that the naturalist conclusion from CSR becomes inescapable.
This approach, however, equally suffers from a lack of philosophical acumen. 
For even when CSR-theories do not work as a ‘defeating defeaters’ of religious 
belief, they may still operate as an ‘undercutting defeaters’. That is, even though 
they do not rebut all or any religious belief claims, they may change the reasons 
believers have for holding them. If you always thought you believed in God because 
you experienced God’s presence or had other good reasons for doing so, and it is 
then pointed out to you that as a matter of fact belief in God is fostered by evolved 
cognitive mechanisms operating in your brain, then you may have a problem. To be 
sure, the problem need not be irresolvable, but it is still a problem that should be 
given careful philosophical (and perhaps theological) attention. It is exactly here 
that the present volume comes in.
Meanwhile, the overview of philosophical and theological debates about CSR 
given above shows that many of these debates are far from settled. New develop-
ments within CSR may make reassessments of certain claims made in the literature 
necessary. Our book aims to contribute to such reassessments, to advance existing 
discussions and initiate new inquiries. Some papers continue the discussion about 
the epistemic impact of CSR-theories, others discuss or criticize the current state of 
CSR, and still others aim to improve CSR-theorizing. While many earlier assess-
ments of the epistemic impact of CSR-theories relied on a small number of them or 
did not discuss the theories in great detail, some of the papers in the book offer a 
more profound discussion of the theories. In this way, a better assessment is 
possible.
5 The quote is from the handout of a paper given at our university (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) 
by the American historian and psychologist of religion Robert C.  Fuller entitled “Religion is 
Nonsense. Cognitive Science and the Biological Substrates of Religion” (March 19, 2018).
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The book also shows that philosophy has a lot to offer to CSR. Rather than dis-
missing CSR or doing armchair philosophy, the contributions show that philosophy 
and CSR can collaborate fruitfully and help each other to move forward. Though 
some contributions are critical of the current state of CSR, they also make sugges-
tions for improvement. Finally, the contributions show that philosophy of religion 
should be mindful of developments in CSR. This not only holds for discussions 
about the rationality of religious belief but also for broader issues. CSR has grown 
to be a major player in the field of religious studies that can no longer be neglected 
by mainstream philosophy of religion.
1.4  Overview of the Book
The book sets out with two essays that provide an overview and discussion of the 
current state of art in CSR and how we have come to reach that state of art, one by 
Lluis Oviedo and one by Claire White.
In order to offer a critical assessment of contemporary CSR, Oviedo reviews the 
development and current state reached by that approach to the study of religion. In 
his opinion the time is ripe for summing up what has been achieved in that endeav-
our, and what deserves a more accurate scrutiny to discern its limits and to give 
advice about possibly needed corrections. In that sense, criticism points first to prob-
lems with the theoretical frameworks that inspired and provided a foundation for 
CSR. It has come to be broadly assumed that cognitive science has moved quite fast 
from the models proposed in the nineties, arguing for some revision of the previous 
applications built on that ‘platform’. This limit arises in a similar way regarding evo-
lutionary studies, and hence to its application to the study of religion. Indeed, multi-
level theories take the place of formerly dominant reductive approaches. The second 
point concerns the amount of empirical evidence that CSR can exhibit. This is an 
open question after the recent available research showing a plurality of outcomes, 
which discourages any straightforward understanding of the proposed theories.
Over the past 15 years or so, the number of empirical projects in CSR has grown 
exponentially and so too has the amount of attention paid to the field, including 
questions about what CSR is, how it conceptualizes religion, and what it explains. 
The aim of White’s chapter is to contribute to these discussions by outlining the 
main objectives of CSR and the assumptions underlying the field. In particular, CSR 
has often been criticized for not engaging in extensive debates about what religion 
is. In this chapter, White focuses mainly on how CSR scholars construe religion and 
why they have eschewed these definitional debates in favor of engaging in empirical 
research. After that, she discusses how CSR conceptualizes religion, and how this 
differs from other approaches. Next, she considers how this conceptualization of 
religion shapes how scholars study it. Finally, she considers the question of how 
CSR actually explains religion.
The next two essays, by Aku Visala and Robert Nola, both deal with the role of 
naturalism and naturalistic explanation in contemporary CSR.
H. van Eyghen et al.
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The cognitive-evolutionary study of religion takes itself as “naturalizing” not 
only the study of religion, but the humanities as a whole as well. According to 
Visala, apart from the obvious denial of non-supernatural causal factors, it is some-
times difficult to see whether this naturalization involves anything more than a gen-
eral rhetorical strategy meant to play up the “science” part (and downplay other, 
“non-scientific” approaches). In his paper, Visala seeks to identify the basic philo-
sophical assumptions of the naturalization project, present some critical points 
about them, and suggest what he considers to be more plausible assumptions 
instead. The basic assumptions of the naturalization project include a commitment 
to a specific kind of unity of science, a commitment to a certain kind of inter-level 
reduction and explanatory fundamentalism, and a deep suspicion towards causal 
factors above the cognitive/psychological level. He suggests that these commit-
ments suffer from a number of problems and that the goals of the cognitive- 
evolutionary study can be achieved just as well, or even better, by adopting weaker 
and more plausible commitments. Here, he briefly discusses some new accounts of 
mechanistic explanation, Robert McCauley’s model of inter- and intra-level rela-
tionships and the idea of explanatory pluralism. He conjectures that loosening the 
“naturalistic” constraints of the cognitive-evolutionary study of religion might result 
in a more pluralistic (but nevertheless strict) approach to religion.
In his chapter, Nola contrasts naturalistic with supernaturalistic explanations of 
religious belief. He argues that there are two broad rival explanations for religious 
belief. The first, the common “folk” or religious explanation, is supernaturalistic in 
that it invokes a deity as a central causal factor in the etiology of people’s belief in 
the existence of God. The second is naturalistic in that it eschews any appeal to a 
deity in the explanation of a person’s belief in God and instead invokes only natu-
ralistic factors in the causal etiology of such beliefs. In his paper, Nola addresses 
two questions. The first question is how well supported by the evidence these natu-
ralistic theories are. The second question is how we might compare some naturalis-
tic explanations with a non-naturalistic “folk” explanation. One way in which 
naturalistic and non-naturalistic theories can be compared with one another is much 
the same as one might compare rival theories in science, though other consider-
ations might come into play. Here a number of criteria can be invoked, such as 
ontological parsimony (other things being equal, prefer the theory which postulates 
fewer entities than another which postulates more) and evidential strength (other 
things being equal, prefer the evidentially stronger theory). On criteria such as 
these, Nola argues that naturalistic explanations of religious belief have the edge 
over non-naturalistic “folk’ explanations. Once this is granted, it can be seen why 
many in the history of philosophy have claimed that naturalistic explanations of 
religious belief lead to the debunking of religion; religious “folk” theories have the 
wrong causal etiology for religious belief in the existence of a deity.
The next three essays explore three specific issues in current CSR: the debate 
about adaptationism versus cognitivism, the explanation for what might be consid-
ered to be silly beliefs, and the nature of supernatural beliefs as regress-stoppers.
Religious beliefs can be explained in at least two different ways, cognitive and 
adaptationist. Each of them is a different kind of explanation, one is proximate and 
1 The Cognitive Science of Religion, Philosophy and Theology: A Survey of the Issues
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the other ultimate. Each of them provides the other with a specific status for reli-
gious beliefs, such as being a by-product or being an adaptation. However, there is 
no clarity as to how cognition itself could be religiously biased and how the reli-
gious/theistic approach could work as a default cognitive mode, as CSR suggests. In 
his paper, Konrad Scozik criticizes cognitive assumptions in the study of religion 
and shows how adaptationist accounts are preferable. He specifically focuses on the 
functional context of religious components, the social and psychological applica-
tions. He makes suggestions as to how discussing a cognitive basis does not matter 
in these fields and argues that the cognitive account cannot explain the ubiquity of 
religious components that lie in their function, rather than the alleged connection 
with cognition.
In his paper, John Wilkins focuses on beliefs that might be called silly. People – 
and not only religious people – often have beliefs that are widely regarded as silly 
by the experts or by the general population. This leads us to ask why believers 
believe silly things if they are widely thought to be silly, and then why believers 
believe the specific things they do. Wilkins proposes that silly beliefs function as 
in-group and out-group tribal markers. Such markers act as an honest costly signal. 
They are honest and costly because such beliefs are hard to fake. Then he offers a 
developmentalist account of belief formation, in which beliefs are thought to be the 
result of a process of acquiring beliefs as cheaply and effectively as possible, lead-
ing to a reluctance to abandon early core beliefs later in life. Then he considers 
whether beliefs can even form a unified worldview, and asks how conversion occurs 
within the developmental characterization he proposes. Finally, he considers how 
this may play out in terms of crises of faith.
In his chapter, Paolo Mantovani addresses the question of what the role of expla-
nation is in shaping and sustaining religious beliefs, if it indeed has any such role. 
CSR has been generally dismissive of so-called ‘intellectualist’ approaches to reli-
gion emphasizing the explanatory role of religious beliefs. Here, he argues, first, 
that some of the arguments against intellectualism found in the CSR literature are 
overstated and that some ‘minimally intellectualist’ propositions concerning reli-
gion are not only compatible with CSR, but are indeed implied by some of its core, 
‘foundational’ theories. Second, he looks at ultimate explanations of origins, argu-
ing that, with respect to the latter, explanations appealing to the will and actions of 
minded agents have an intuitive advantage over other kinds of explanations, and 
that, again, this follows from core CSR theories. Gods, he argues, are better regress- 
blockers than, say, inanimate causes, and this follows from the deeply rooted intu-
itions about basic ontological kinds that CSR theorizes about.
The final three contributions to this book, namely those by Justin McBrayer, 
Matthew Braddock, and ourselves all scrutinize what the epistemic ramifications of 
CSR are. In other words, how does empirical research from CSR bear on the posi-
tive or negative epistemic status of supernatural beliefs? McBrayer and Braddock 
explore the status of supernatural belief in general, whereas we focus on a specific 
belief that is important to the great monotheistic traditions, namely the belief that 
sin or evil has had certain cognitive consequences.
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As McBrayer rightly notes, beliefs have genealogies. In his paper, he explores 
whether tracing a belief’s genealogy can illuminate the epistemic quality of the 
belief. The paper sets out by sketching a general epistemology of genealogies. As it 
turns out, genealogies for beliefs come in two sorts: those that trace a belief to some 
mental event that doubles as evidence for the belief and those that do not. The for-
mer have the potential to undercut the belief, rebut the belief, or, importantly, both. 
The latter have the potential to reinforce the belief or rebut the belief but, impor-
tantly, not undercut it. The ultimate conclusion is that there is a role for genealogies 
in the epistemic appraisal of our beliefs, but that this role will be circumscribed by 
the availability of clear and compelling genealogies.
In contrast to his earlier work (see above section 2.1), Matthew Braddock gives 
what he calls an ‘evidential argument’ from CSR for theism, that is, the thesis that 
there is God. As he rightly notes, the lion’s share of the discussion about the ramifi-
cations of CSR fixates on whether CSR undermines (or debunks or explains away) 
theistic belief. There has been very little attention for the issue of whether the field 
could offer positive support for theism. In his contribution Braddock explores how 
CSR could offer such positive support. His answer to this question takes the form of 
an evidential argument for theism from standard models and research in the field. 
According to CSR, we are naturally disposed to believe in supernatural agents and 
these beliefs are constrained in certain ways. The three main theories of this super-
natural disposition are byproduct theories, adaptationist theories, and hybrid theo-
ries. Braddock argues that our supernatural disposition – as understood by any of 
the main theories – is surprising and improbable given naturalism but less so given 
theism and, hence, serves as evidence for theism over naturalism.
In our own contribution to this volume, we explore how CSR relates to a core 
idea, important in mainstream Christianity and Reformed Epistemology, namely 
that sin and evil have certain cognitive consequences. In particular, sin is believed to 
have diminished and distorted human knowledge of God. This is important, for, 
recently, Helen de Cruz and Johan de Smedt have suggested that some CSR theories 
are in tension with the notion that sin has diminished and distorted our human 
knowledge of God. According to them, it is problematic to claim that certain evolu-
tionary explanations are correct and that sin has such cognitive consequences. After 
some terminological clarifications we spell out in detail the argument developed by 
De Smedt and De Cruz against a historic Fall. Next, we pause a moment in order to 
ponder exactly what is at stake here. Subsequently, we discuss three possible solu-
tions of how evolutionary explanations of religious belief can be wedded to a 
 historic account of the Fall. We conclude that there is no tension between CSR on 
the one hand, and the ideas that human beings have fallen into sin and that that has 
had devastating cognitive consequences on the other.6
6 This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Templeton World 
Charity Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton World Charity Foundation.
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